FLIGHT SCHOOLS: A CONTINUING RISK?

Oct 1, 2003 12:00 PM, By BETH WADE

At Phoenix Air Flight School, security is grounded in watchfulness. “We look at people a little closer than we ever might have done in the past,” says Andrew Dunham, flight instructor for the Cartersville, Ga.-based school. “We're more vigilant on who does flight training with us. We're more vigilant on who's in the area.”

That vigilance includes knowing the students, Dunham says. “We take more details from them nowadays; if they are a licensed pilot, we keep copies of their pilot's license and their medical certificate; we copy their driver's license; we talk to them a little bit more and get more of an understanding of their background,” he explains.

Since 2001, when the nation learned that two of the Sept. 11 terrorists had trained at U.S. flight schools, applicant identification has become common practice for flight schools. It is one of several measures that have worked to improve security, says Daniel Benny, a private investigator and security consultant based in Harrisburg, Pa.

“Flight schools are safer [than they were two years ago],” Benny says. “Most are looking at identification; they are generally securing keys now; and they are notifying authorities when something suspicious occurs.” However, physical security — particularly measures to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft — remains weak, he notes.

Planes, claims and automobiles

More than 3,000 flight schools operate in the United States, according to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), based in Frederick, Md. Ranging from universities to small businesses, the schools qualify pilots for student, recreational, private, instrument-rated and commercial certification, and for flight instructor, airline transport and examiner certification.

Flight schools are part of a larger general aviation industry that excludes commercial airline and military aviation. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the nation's general aviation fleet consists of 219,000 aircraft, nearly 70 percent of which are single-engine piston airplanes. Multi-engine piston, turboprop, turbojet, rotorcraft and experimental aircraft make up the remainder of the fleet.

In a given year, personal and corporate travel accounts for 47 percent of general aviation hours flown, while instructional flying accounts for less than 20 percent. GAO reports that, in general, instructional flying involves the use of small propeller aircraft.

The notion that small airplanes can be used as weapons of mass destruction is a fallacy, according to AOPA President Phil Boyer. “It took a moving truck packed with explosives in Oklahoma City. It took an airliner loaded with thousands of gallons of fuel in New York City,” Boyer wrote in a March 2003 editorial in The Boston Globe. “The typical general aviation pilot flies a single-engine, propeller-driven, four-seat aircraft. Fully loaded, the aircraft weighs about the same as a Honda Civic weighs empty. It carries 50 gallons of aviation fuel, which is essentially the same octane level as premium automobile gasoline.”

In a June letter to USA Today, Boyer noted that the size, weight and speed of general aviation aircraft are not enough to harm nuclear power plants. “Reactor containment buildings are designed to withstand the impact of a large commercial airliner — an aircraft capable of generating 2,300 times the kinetic force of the typical general aviation aircraft.”

That is not to say that a small airplane could not be used as a weapon. In May 2003, the Department of Homeland Security issued an advisory that notified general aviation pilots and airports that Al-Qaida “has long considered attacking U.S. Homeland targets using light aircraft.” The advisory noted that a general aviation aircraft loaded with explosives is “the equivalent of a medium-sized truck bomb.”

The human equation

The risk of someone taking a small airplane and using it to inflict terror is the same for flight schools as it is for all of general aviation. Probability depends on access to aircraft, which flight schools can manage, and pilot intent, which they cannot control.

“Once a person is a certified pilot, or to the point where they can learn to fly [solo], there's not a whole lot you can do,” says David Huser, vice president for West Chicago-based American Flyers. Benny agrees. “If you have a student who's doing solo work, they're authorized to be flying that plane,” he says. “The only thing you can do is catch something in their motivation beforehand.”

In addition to checking identification of applicants, flight schools can “screen” prospective students with a no-cost, informal orientation, Benny says. Orientation staff should ask applicants why they want to learn to fly, and they should be alert to students who are anxious to learn right away, who want to learn only specific aspects of flying or who want to pay in cash, he says. Flight instructors should be alert as well, noting changes in attitude over the course of instruction or interest in flying over particular areas.

Flight instructors also play a role in controlling aircraft access. In January 2002, a teenager stole a Cessna 172 from a Florida flight school after his instructor left him unattended to preflight the aircraft. The student took off without authorization, flew through military airspace and deliberately crashed the airplane into a downtown Tampa apartment building.

Following that event, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued suggestions for enhancing security at flight schools and fixed-base operations (see sidebar). The initial suggestions, which were later revised, contained a now-missing recommendation that pre-solo students be supervised by flight instructors at all times.

“Our flight instructors go out with every single student while they preflight the airplane, but I don't think a lot of flight schools do that,” Huser says. “It's not uncommon for an instructor to sit and have a cup of coffee while he ships the student out to preflight the aircraft. I don't think that's safe; I don't think it's prudent; and I don't think it provides customer service and value. And it's probably the one [problem] that's easiest to fix.”

Easy access?

Although many flight schools may be balking at the FAA's suggestion for preflight attention, most are not ignoring another of its recommendations: Aircraft keys should be secured. “It wasn't uncommon before to go into a fixed-base operation and [find] the keys hanging on a board where anybody could pick them up,” Benny says. “Most places are starting to secure keys and put them in a lock-box or back office area.”

At American Flyers' 14 schools, keys are locked in safes and released to students only when their flights are dispatched. “We have a specific dispatch procedure that we use to know where the student is going and when they are coming back,” Huser explains. “Every flight needs to be dispatched by an authorized person. All the aircraft keys are locked up; they are monitored by the operations personnel; and no student gets a key without a dispatch. It's probably the best level of security you can have.”

Although dispatch and key management procedures can help reduce the likelihood of unauthorized flights, they do not do enough to minimize the risk, Benny says. “I think there could be more done for physical security of the aircraft,” he notes.

For example, many schools store their aircraft in open hangars or tied to airfields that are not enclosed by fences. “If you don't put fencing and alarms up, people can get to the aircraft,” Benny says. “And, even though you control keys, it's possible to start the aircraft [without them]. If you know what you're doing, you can start a plane by cranking the prop.”

Nevertheless, he does not anticipate a voluntary move to install fences around tie-down areas or hangars. “That's a pretty expensive proposition,” Benny says. “I'm not aware of any of the small general aviation airports that are doing that.”

Although the FAA has not formally recommended fencing to flight schools or fixed-base operators, it has suggested that flight schools install separate locks for aircraft doors and ignitions. AOPA has opposed state-level efforts to require dual locks, calling the requirement “unnecessary, costly and burdensome.”

At Phoenix Air Flight School, the school's five airplanes are tied to the airfield. “We don't [key the doors separately from the ignitions]. Not as yet,” Dunham says. “But we've been thinking along those lines.”

American Flyers — with half of its 50 aircraft stored in hangars and the other half tied down — has ruled out such a change. Dual locks would be ineffective, Huser says. “If someone's going to break into an airplane, they're going to get in,” he explains. “I've been locked out of an airplane before. The keys got locked into it, and I was able to grab a key from a different model of aircraft and open it and get in through the baggage door.”

As an alternative to separate locks on doors and ignitions, Benny proposes the use of propeller and throttle locks to prevent unauthorized use of aircraft. “These are items that cost maybe $10 or $15, but I don't see a lot of them being used. I don't see any effort on the part of general aviation to secure the aircraft that are sitting out [on the airfields].”

Vigilance over restriction

Hit by the publicity tailspin of 2001 and by flight restrictions following Sept. 11, flight schools are only this year beginning to recover. Reluctance to employ locking devices or other restrictive measures (e.g., gated access to airfields, electronic code or card access to facilities) is, in part, an effort to preserve business.

“What we're doing in our industry is putting more barriers in front of our customers, and we're losing customers,” Huser says. “We can't go so far in that direction.”

Dunham agrees. “Security is a major issue to all of us, and we're interested in keeping things as secure as possible,” he says.

“There's the business aspect as well, and we have to have a careful balance.”

Advocating vigilance over restriction, AOPA partnered with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in 2002 to develop Airport Watch, a voluntary program for observing and reporting suspicious activity. Based on the Neighborhood Watch concept, the program encourages pilots to serve as the eyes and ears of airport security.

AOPA has distributed Airport Watch kits — including an instructional video, brochure and signs — to approximately 2,000 of the country's 4,800 public-use airports. It also has sent the brochure — including suggestions for securing aircraft and guidelines for recognizing and reporting suspicious behavior — to all registered U.S. pilots. (See sidebar on page 17.)

Dunham is one of many proponents of the Airport Watch concept. Phoenix Air Flight School has adopted guidelines from the FAA and AOPA, as well as other associations, he notes.

“We're concerned about keeping an eye on people as they walk around the aircraft, [and] we're more vigilant on who's in the area,” he says. “All of our staff — not just the flight instructors — have been made aware that they need to look for anything that looks suspicious in any way.”

According to Dunham, terror by small airplane is viewed by the general aviation industry as a “fairly minimal” risk. Nevertheless, flight schools are taking that risk seriously. “Everyone's being more aware of what's going on around them,” he notes. “If we don't add more security, and if we're not more vigilant about our aircraft and our surroundings, then [flight schools] could always be seen as a weak area that someone might take advantage of.”

AIRPORT WATCH

Know Your Neighborhood Pilot

Launched in December 2002 by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), Airport Watch was distributed to all registered U.S. pilots and to all major public-use airports. Developed in partnership with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the program provides guidelines for recognizing suspicious behavior and provides a toll-free telephone number (1-866-GA-SECURE) for reporting observations to the National Response Center.

Airport Watch participants are instructed to look for the following:

• Pilots who appear under the control of someone else.

• Anyone trying to access an aircraft through force — without keys, using a crowbar or screwdriver.

• Anyone who seems unfamiliar with aviation procedures trying to check out an airplane.

• Anyone who misuses aviation lingo — or seems too eager to use all the lingo.

• People or groups who seem determined to keep to themselves.

• Any members of their airport neighborhood who work to avoid contact.

• Anyone who appears to be just loitering, with no specific reason for being there.

• Any out-of-the-ordinary videotaping of aircraft or hangars.

• Aircraft with unusual or obviously unauthorized modifications.

• Dangerous cargo or loads — explosives, chemicals, openly displayed weapons — being loaded into an airplane.

• Anything that strikes them as wrong.

They are instructed to note height, weight and the individual's clothing or other identifiable traits when making a report.

To download the Airport Watch brochure or to view the instructional video, visit AOPA's Web site at www.aopa.org.

NOTICE 8700.17

FAA Security Enhancements Overview

In January 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Notice 8700.12, Suggestions for Enhanced Security at General Aviation Airports. Initially written to address security issues concerning student pilots, the document was revised in October 2002 to encompass all pilots.

The current notice (8700.17) makes the following recommendations for flight schools and fixed-base operators:

• Use a different aircraft ignition key from the door lock key.

• Limit pilot access to aircraft keys until the pilot has met the fixed base operator's or flight school's insurance requirements for rental of or instruction in aircraft.

• Consider having all pilots check in with a specific employee — i.e., dispatcher, aircraft scheduler, a flight instructor, or some other “management” official — before being allowed access to parked aircraft; or have the pilot sign or initial a form and not receive keys until an instructor or other “management official” also signs or initials.

• Establish positive identification of any pilot before every flight.

• To prevent unauthorized use of aircraft, take steps appropriate to the specific type of aircraft to secure it when it is unattended.

• Place a prominent sign near areas of public access warning against tampering with or unauthorized use of aircraft; clearly post emergency telephone numbers (police, fire, FBI) so that people may report suspicious activity. (Emphasize that people other than employees should not take action on suspicious activity but should report it to the appropriate law enforcement authority.)

• Train employees as well as pilots who regularly use the airport to be on the lookout for suspicious activity, e.g., transient aircraft with unusual or unauthorized modifications; persons loitering for extended periods in the vicinity of parked aircraft or in pilot lounges; pilots who appear to be under the control of another person; persons wishing to rent aircraft without presenting proper credentials or identification; persons who present apparently valid credentials but who do not display a corresponding level of aviation knowledge; any pilot who makes threats or statements inconsistent with normal uses or aircraft; or events or circumstances that do not fit the pattern of lawful, normal activity at an airport.

To obtain additional information about general aviation security, including updated notices, visit the FAA's Web site at www.faa.gov

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