Airports Still at Risk

Apr 1, 2006 12:00 PM, By Billie H. Vincent

THE UNITED STATES and a number of other countries are particularly vulnerable to the simultaneous use of suicide car bombs against airport terminal buildings. Some countries have addressed this vulnerability with countermeasures, but in most instances, the measures do not fully address the problem.

The validity of vehicle bomb threats from Al Qaeda's perspective is illustrated by the February 2006 attack on Saudi oil facilities. The attack on the gargantuan Abqaiq oil facility — which was repelled by Saudi security forces — consisted of two cars carrying explosives that attempted to penetrate the facility's defenses, The New York Times reported. Each of the two cars was carrying as much as 2,200 pounds of ammonium nitrate, nitroglycerine, RDX and other substances, according to a Reuters report.

Another pressing threat is the simultaneous attack by multiple suicide attackers using improvised explosive devices concealed within baggage during peak check-in periods in crowded major airport terminals. The deaths and injuries from three or four suicide bombers each simultaneously detonating 20-30 pounds of C-4 plastic explosives studded with nails secreted in suitcases in a crowded airport terminal are beyond belief. But it could be the principal vulnerability at U.S. airports. World events have shown that both of these attack scenarios are attractive to terrorists.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its subordinate organizations, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have seemed to publicly ignore vulnerability to these threats. While it is impossible to know what the DHS or any of its subordinate organizations have done covertly to address this threat, on the surface at least, no publicly known countermeasures have been instituted.

Is there an articulated threat scenario for these methods of attacks? There should be as past experience indicates that if there is an attractive enough vulnerability in America's defenses, the adversary will exploit that vulnerability. A terrorist's casual observation of the U.S. aviation system would have revealed these vulnerabilities.

The failure of the DHS to address these vulnerabilities is puzzling as a number of other countries — such as Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — have instituted countermeasures to address similar threats including vehicle surveillance, assessment and inspection systems on their roadways well prior to the vehicles reaching airport terminal buildings; and some level of inspection of people and baggage as they enter the terminal. As with any other countermeasures, none of these systems will ever be 100-percent effective, but that should not deter the United States from adding these defenses as additional layers of overall aviation security systems.

Effective countermeasures are not particularly attractive in their impact or cost. A three-stage system is necessary to have a reasonable chance of preventing successful attacks using suicide vehicle bombs against terminal buildings:

• Stage 1 is a surveillance and preliminary assessment of all vehicles on the approach road(s) to airport terminal buildings.

• Stage 2 is a station for those vehicles designated for inspection by the Stage 1 surveillance team(s).

• Stage 3 is the installation of barriers — both above and below ground — as a means of stopping relatively large vehicles if they ignore orders to stop for inspections at Stage 2. Would these countermeasures be effective? What would it cost, and what would be the impact on aviation and ancillary operations? None of the answers to these questions will provide anyone with any high degree of comfort or satisfaction.

The likelihood of attack

The logistics associated with acquiring the materials to make a bomb require consummate skills and, like other terrorist operations have demonstrated, require a dedication to a goal that is not easily accomplished. Just obtaining the explosives to build a large vehicle bomb is probably difficult given the overall tightening of acquisition procedures for ammonia nitrates in the United States after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Nonetheless, it is possible that it could be done provided the right “insider” or “sleeper” personnel were available to assist the terrorists.

Obtaining high explosives such as C-4 is likely more difficult than obtaining ammonia nitrates, but again, it is possible given the assistance of an insider — or by theft. The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATFE) regularly reports on thefts of explosives — usually dynamite or slurries but sometimes military grade high-explosives — around the United States.

A third method of obtaining military-grade explosives would be the illegal movement of explosives into the United States through seaborne cargo. A military-grade explosive would be the ideal choice for a terrorist group wishing to detonate suitcase bombs in terminal buildings. In fact, a high explosive would be the only way a terrorist could hope to wreak havoc under such conditions, as any low-explosive would normally be too bulky to conceal within a suitcase — particularly one using ammonia nitrates, as well as being quite smelly and therefore inviting suspicion. The probability is slim, but it is nevertheless a possibility.

An alternative would be for the terrorists to make their own explosives — as they have been known to do using chemicals available on the open market. Ramzi Yousef of 1993 World Trade Center bombing infamy and his Bojinka gang were doing just that in Manila, Philippines, in late 1994 when they made a mistake and caused a fire. Their Bojinka plans were to bomb 12 U.S. airliners operating in the western Pacific Ocean area. The fire department's response caused Ramzi and his team to vacate the apartment, and that subsequently resulted in the police discovering their bomb factory. Ramzi Yousef's Bojinka failure notwithstanding, other groups have succeeded in making their own triacetone triperoxide (TATP) explosives — so it could be done.

Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have a history of returning to failed operations. Ahmad Ressam, an Algerian national living in Canada, was caught trying to bring homemade explosives into the United States in late 1999 through Port Angeles in Washington. He subsequently confessed to planning to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. Yousef and his gang in New York and New Jersey failed in their 1993 effort to bring down a World Trade Center tower. Mohammed Atta and his hijacking teams succeeded in completing the job in 2001. The plan to attack Los Angeles International Airport could be accomplished by using a vehicle bomb — or the simultaneous detonation of multiple suitcase bombs.

It is interesting that Los Angeles is perhaps the only U.S. airport that is known to have seriously contemplated building a system that would prevent a vehicle bomb from reaching the front of a terminal building. The Rand Corporation (www.rand.org) recently published a study entitled “Implementing Security Improvement Options at Los Angeles International Airport.” In this study, Rand addresses the possibility of establishing vehicle checkpoints at the six roadway access points to the airport. They concluded that it would cost from $5 to $7 million to establish these checkpoints.

The Rand study reported that Los Angles World Airports (LAWA) “completed an in-depth study of adding and staffing permanent vehicle checkpoints. Although their infrastructure costs were about the same as ours, they assumed much higher staffing costs.” The Rand study went on to state that “LAWA concluded that the congestion caused by the checkpoints was too disruptive and the staffing costs too high to provide round-the-clock inspections of every vehicle.”

Los Angeles World Airports has shown the most initiative by a U.S. airport authority in this regard, but it still backed away from addressing the vehicle bomb vulnerability. Given that LAWA has been the most progressive on this issue, and it backed away from doing anything, what can we expect from other U.S. airports?

It is interesting that the Rand study for LAWA also concluded that “existing lines (of people) create an attractive target where a terrorist could bring a substantial bomb concealed in luggage with little risk of arousing suspicion.” The problem is that airport security has a limited choice of countermeasures against suitcase bombs in the check-in areas in virtually all U.S. airports. These countermeasures would seem to be restricted to:

• Establishment of checkpoints for examining baggage off-airport in safe areas where people are dispersed and bomb detonation mitigation features are built in to the check-in areas, or

• Inspecting all baggage at the entrance to the airport terminal buildings.

One of these countermeasures was deployed at a European airport in the 1980s that was processing passengers and their baggage en route to Israel. The features of the facility were designed to limit deaths and injuries to small groups of people — but would not have prevented all persons from being killed or maimed.

The second option would do little to reduce the number of deaths and injuries, because most airport terminal entrances are constructed of glass — or have large areas of glass. Some additional mitigation of deaths and injuries can be realized if the terminal entrances are of substantial steel or masonry construction and the suitcase inspections are done immediately outside the terminal building. The implementation of these countermeasures for suitcase bombs would raise havoc with the current U.S. checked baggage screening system using Computed Tomography (CT) explosives detection units.

Why has it not happened yet? Only the terrorists know.

But we can assume from Ahmad Ressam's intention to bomb Los Angeles International Airport that Al Qaeda did indeed intend to use this method of attack. It was only through the alertness of a U.S. Customs Inspector at Port Angeles that it did not happen. An equally valid question is: Why only airports? Why not the Grand Central Train Station in New York City, or the Union Train Station in downtown Washington? First, these facilities are not easily accessible to large vehicle bombs because there is some depth to them before reaching large concentrations of people. But, even so, ramming a large vehicle bomb through the entrance doors of the Union Train Station in Washington and then detonating the explosives would result in extensive deaths and injuries. Simultaneous suicide bombers with suitcases packed with explosives could penetrate to the depths of the Grand Central Station in New York or Washington's Union Station during the peak traffic periods and also kill scores of people.

So, why not the same concern for trains as for airports? That the Al Qaeda associates consider trains a valid and desirable target is evidenced by the simultaneous bombing of the morning commuting trains in Madrid in March 2004.

The predicament we find ourselves in is that we have many vulnerabilities, and we face a high threat level from a demonstrably capable adversary. The choice of attack(s), the time of the attack(s), method(s) of attack(s) are all the choice of this adversary. We cannot afford to waste critical and scarce resources and therefore must choose our actions and countermeasures wisely.

One cannot address the costs of countermeasures without also considering consequence-costs of a failure to prevent attacks. Some have calculated the cost of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks to be well in excess of a trillion U.S. dollars to the world economy. The true cost consequences are still being felt and may continue for decades — in short, they are incalculable.

How devastating to our national would be a successful attack on our airports or major train stations resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries? How would it affect our sense of self-worth? Our determination to prevail in the war on terrorism? Can we afford to ignore this possibility — dare we do so?

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Billie H. Vincent is the president and CEO of Aerospace Services International Inc., Chantilly, Va., and a former director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. ASI is an aviation security engineering design and consulting firm. E-mail him at bhv@asiwebsite.com

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